6dd4b07138eb8f479cc4205036c9d6a1794a9f80 galt Mon Nov 15 13:30:07 2021 -0800 Add domain exceptions whitelist for allowing us to configure a small number of exceptions that are old servers that are still incompatible with openssl. hg.conf setting httpsCertCheckDomainExceptions or env var https_cert_check_domain_exceptions. This setting is not intended to be used for new servers which should just be advised on correct openssl compatibility, which usually means getting their server to output their intermediate certs as well, or even the cert chain which is typically just 3 certs. refs #28458 diff --git src/lib/https.c src/lib/https.c index e73bfac..3136fb5 100644 --- src/lib/https.c +++ src/lib/https.c @@ -1,564 +1,641 @@ /* Connect via https. */ /* Copyright (C) 2012 The Regents of the University of California * See README in this or parent directory for licensing information. */ #include "openssl/ssl.h" #include "openssl/err.h" #include <sys/socket.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <pthread.h> #include <signal.h> #include "common.h" #include "internet.h" #include "errAbort.h" +#include "hash.h" #include "net.h" static pthread_mutex_t *mutexes = NULL; static unsigned long openssl_id_callback(void) { return ((unsigned long)pthread_self()); } static void openssl_locking_callback(int mode, int n, const char * file, int line) { if (mode & CRYPTO_LOCK) pthread_mutex_lock(&mutexes[n]); else pthread_mutex_unlock(&mutexes[n]); } void openssl_pthread_setup(void) { int i; int numLocks = CRYPTO_num_locks(); AllocArray(mutexes, numLocks); for (i = 0; i < numLocks; i++) pthread_mutex_init(&mutexes[i], NULL); CRYPTO_set_id_callback(openssl_id_callback); CRYPTO_set_locking_callback(openssl_locking_callback); } struct netConnectHttpsParams /* params to pass to thread */ { pthread_t thread; int sv[2]; /* the pair of socket descriptors */ BIO *sbio; // ssl bio }; static void xerrno(char *msg) { fprintf(stderr, "%s : %s\n", strerror(errno), msg); fflush(stderr); } static void xerr(char *msg) { fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", msg); fflush(stderr); } void openSslInit() /* do only once */ { static boolean done = FALSE; static pthread_mutex_t osiMutex = PTHREAD_MUTEX_INITIALIZER; pthread_mutex_lock( &osiMutex ); if (!done) { SSL_library_init(); ERR_load_crypto_strings(); ERR_load_SSL_strings(); OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); openssl_pthread_setup(); done = TRUE; } pthread_mutex_unlock( &osiMutex ); } void *netConnectHttpsThread(void *threadParam) /* use a thread to run socket back to user */ { /* child */ struct netConnectHttpsParams *params = threadParam; pthread_detach(params->thread); // this thread will never join back with it's progenitor /* we need to wait on both the user's socket and the BIO SSL socket * to see if we need to ferry data from one to the other */ fd_set readfds; fd_set writefds; struct timeval tv; int err; char sbuf[32768]; // socket buffer sv[1] to user char bbuf[32768]; // bio buffer int srd = 0; int swt = 0; int brd = 0; int bwt = 0; int fd = 0; while (1) { // Do NOT move this outside the while loop. /* Get underlying file descriptor, needed for select call */ fd = BIO_get_fd(params->sbio, NULL); if (fd == -1) { xerr("BIO doesn't seem to be initialized in https, unable to get descriptor."); goto cleanup; } FD_ZERO(&readfds); FD_ZERO(&writefds); if (brd == 0) FD_SET(fd, &readfds); if (swt < srd) FD_SET(fd, &writefds); if (srd == 0) FD_SET(params->sv[1], &readfds); tv.tv_sec = (long) (DEFAULTCONNECTTIMEOUTMSEC/1000); // timeout default 10 seconds tv.tv_usec = (long) (((DEFAULTCONNECTTIMEOUTMSEC/1000)-tv.tv_sec)*1000000); err = select(max(fd,params->sv[1]) + 1, &readfds, &writefds, NULL, &tv); /* Evaluate select() return code */ if (err < 0) { xerr("error during select()"); goto cleanup; } else if (err == 0) { /* Timed out - just quit */ xerr("https timeout expired"); goto cleanup; } else { if (FD_ISSET(params->sv[1], &readfds)) { swt = 0; srd = read(params->sv[1], sbuf, 32768); if (srd == -1) { if (errno != 104) // udcCache often closes causing "Connection reset by peer" xerrno("error reading user pipe for https socket"); goto cleanup; } if (srd == 0) break; // user closed socket, we are done } if (FD_ISSET(fd, &writefds)) { int swtx = BIO_write(params->sbio, sbuf+swt, srd-swt); if (swtx <= 0) { if (!BIO_should_write(params->sbio)) { ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); xerr("Error writing SSL connection"); goto cleanup; } } else { swt += swtx; if (swt >= srd) { swt = 0; srd = 0; } } } if (FD_ISSET(fd, &readfds)) { bwt = 0; brd = BIO_read(params->sbio, bbuf, 32768); if (brd <= 0) { if (BIO_should_read(params->sbio)) { brd = 0; continue; } else { if (brd == 0) break; ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); xerr("Error reading SSL connection"); goto cleanup; } } // write the https data received immediately back on socket to user, and it's ok if it blocks. while(bwt < brd) { // NOTE: Intended as a thread-specific library-safe way not to ignore SIG_PIPE for the entire application. // temporarily block sigpipe on this thread sigset_t sigpipe_mask; sigemptyset(&sigpipe_mask); sigaddset(&sigpipe_mask, SIGPIPE); sigset_t saved_mask; if (pthread_sigmask(SIG_BLOCK, &sigpipe_mask, &saved_mask) == -1) { perror("pthread_sigmask"); exit(1); } int bwtx = write(params->sv[1], bbuf+bwt, brd-bwt); int saveErrno = errno; if ((bwtx == -1) && (saveErrno == EPIPE)) { // if there was a EPIPE, accept and consume the SIGPIPE now. int sigErr, sig; if ((sigErr = sigwait(&sigpipe_mask, &sig)) != 0) { errno = sigErr; perror("sigwait"); exit(1); } } // restore signal mask on this thread if (pthread_sigmask(SIG_SETMASK, &saved_mask, 0) == -1) { perror("pthread_sigmask"); exit(1); } errno = saveErrno; if (bwtx == -1) { if ((errno != 104) // udcCache often closes causing "Connection reset by peer" && (errno != 32)) // udcCache often closes causing "Broken pipe" xerrno("error writing https data back to user pipe"); goto cleanup; } bwt += bwtx; } brd = 0; bwt = 0; } } } cleanup: BIO_free_all(params->sbio); // will free entire chain of bios close(fd); // Needed because we use BIO_NOCLOSE above. Someday might want to re-use a connection. close(params->sv[1]); /* we are done with it */ return NULL; } static int verify_callback(int preverify_ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { char buf[256]; X509 *cert; int err, depth; cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx); err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx); depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx); /* * Retrieve the pointer to the SSL of the connection currently treated * and the application specific data stored into the SSL object. */ X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), buf, 256); /* * Catch a too long certificate chain. The depth limit set using * SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth() is by purpose set to "limit+1" so * that whenever the "depth>verify_depth" condition is met, we * have violated the limit and want to log this error condition. * We must do it here, because the CHAIN_TOO_LONG error would not * be found explicitly; only errors introduced by cutting off the * additional certificates would be logged. */ if (depth > atoi(getenv("https_cert_check_depth"))) { preverify_ok = 0; err = X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG; X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, err); } if (sameString(getenv("https_cert_check_verbose"), "on")) { fprintf(stderr,"depth=%d:%s\n", depth, buf); } if (!preverify_ok) { if (getenv("SCRIPT_NAME")) // CGI mode { fprintf(stderr, "verify error:num=%d:%s:depth=%d:%s\n", err, X509_verify_cert_error_string(err), depth, buf); } char *cn = strstr(buf, "/CN="); if (cn) cn+=4; // strlen /CN= warn("%s on %s", X509_verify_cert_error_string(err), cn); } /* * At this point, err contains the last verification error. We can use * it for something special */ if (!preverify_ok && (err == X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT)) { X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(ctx->current_cert), buf, 256); fprintf(stderr, "issuer= %s\n", buf); } if (sameString(getenv("https_cert_check"), "warn")) return 1; else return preverify_ok; } +static struct hash *initDomainWhiteListHash() +/* Initialize once, has all the old existing domains + * for which cert checking is skipped since they are not compatible (yet) with openssl.*/ +{ +static struct hash *domainWhiteList = NULL; +static pthread_mutex_t initInUseMutex = PTHREAD_MUTEX_INITIALIZER; + +if (!domainWhiteList) + { + pthread_mutex_lock( &initInUseMutex ); + if (!domainWhiteList) + { + struct hash *domainHash = hashNew(8); + + // Hardwired exceptions + // TODO RESTORE, whitelist removed for testing + // added 2021-11-15 + //hashStoreName(domainHash, "oculargenomics.meei.harvard.edu"); + //hashStoreName(domainHash, "annotation.dbi.udel.edu"); + //hashStoreName(domainHash, "garfield.igh.cnrs.fr"); + //hashStoreName(domainHash, "bioinfo2.ugr.es"); + //hashStoreName(domainHash, "snpinfo.niehs.nih.gov"); + //hashStoreName(domainHash, "edn.som.umaryland.edu"); + //hashStoreName(domainHash, "arn.ugr.es"); + //hashStoreName(domainHash, "hkgateway.med.umich.edu"); + //hashStoreName(domainHash, "hsb.upf.edu"); + //hashStoreName(domainHash, "bioinfo2.ugr.es"); + //hashStoreName(domainHash, "datahub-7ak6xof0.udes.genap.ca"); + //hashStoreName(domainHash, "datahub-nyt53rix.udes.genap.ca"); + //hashStoreName(domainHash, "xinglabtrackhub.research.chop.edu"); + //hashStoreName(domainHash, "ftp.science.ru.nl"); + + // whitelisted domain exceptions set in hg.conf + // space separated list. + char *dmwl = cloneString(getenv("https_cert_check_domain_exceptions")); + int wordCount = chopByWhite(dmwl, NULL, 0); + if (wordCount > 0) + { + char **words; + AllocArray(words, wordCount); + chopByWhite(dmwl, words, wordCount); + int w; + for(w=0; w < wordCount; w++) + { + hashStoreName(domainHash, words[w]); + } + freeMem(words); + } + freez(&dmwl); + domainWhiteList = domainHash; + } + pthread_mutex_unlock( &initInUseMutex ); + } +return domainWhiteList; +} + + int netConnectHttps(char *hostName, int port, boolean noProxy) /* Return socket for https connection with server or -1 if error. */ { int fd=0; // https_cert_check env var can be abort warn or none. setenv("https_cert_check", "warn", 0); // DEFAULT certificate check is warn. -setenv("https_cert_check_depth", "9", 0); // DEFAULT level is warn. +setenv("https_cert_check_depth", "9", 0); // DEFAULT depth check level is 9. + +setenv("https_cert_check_verbose", "off", 0); // DEFAULT verbose is off. -setenv("https_cert_check_verbose", "off", 0); // DEFAULT level is warn. +setenv("https_cert_check_domain_exceptions", "", 0); // DEFAULT space separated list is empty string. char *proxyUrl = getenv("https_proxy"); if (noProxy) proxyUrl = NULL; char *connectHost; int connectPort; BIO *fbio=NULL; // file descriptor bio BIO *sbio=NULL; // ssl bio SSL_CTX *ctx; SSL *ssl; openSslInit(); ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_client_method()); fd_set readfds; fd_set writefds; int err; struct timeval tv; + if (!sameString(getenv("https_cert_check"), "none")) { + if (hashLookup(initDomainWhiteListHash(), hostName)) + { + // old existing domains which are not (yet) compatible with openssl. + if (getenv("SCRIPT_NAME")) // CGI mode + { + fprintf(stderr, "domain %s cert check skipped because it is white listed.\n", hostName); + } + } + else + { + // verify peer cert of the server. // Set TRUSTED_FIRST for openssl 1.0 // Fixes common issue openssl 1.0 had with with LetsEncrypt certs in the Fall of 2021. X509_STORE_set_flags(SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ctx), X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST); - // verify peer cert of the server. + // This flag causes intermediate certificates in the trust store to be treated as trust-anchors, in the same way as the self-signed root CA certificates. + // This makes it possible to trust certificates issued by an intermediate CA without having to trust its ancestor root CA. + // GNU-TLS uses it, and openssl probably will do it in the future. + // Currently this does not fix any of our known issues with users servers certs. + // X509_STORE_set_flags(SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ctx), X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN); // verify_callback gets called once per certificate returned by the server. - SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, verify_callback); // DEBUG REMOVE + SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, verify_callback); /* * Let the verify_callback catch the verify_depth error so that we get * an appropriate error in the logfile. */ SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(ctx, atoi(getenv("https_cert_check_depth")) + 1); // VITAL FOR PROPER VERIFICATION OF CERTS if (!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(ctx)) { warn("SSL set default verify paths failed"); } } + } // Don't want any retries since we are non-blocking bio now // This is available on newer versions of openssl //SSL_set_mode(ssl, SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY); // Support for Http Proxy struct netParsedUrl pxy; if (proxyUrl) { netParseUrl(proxyUrl, &pxy); if (!sameString(pxy.protocol, "http")) { warn("Unknown proxy protocol %s in %s. Should be http.", pxy.protocol, proxyUrl); goto cleanup2; } connectHost = pxy.host; connectPort = atoi(pxy.port); } else { connectHost = hostName; connectPort = port; } fd = netConnect(connectHost,connectPort); if (fd == -1) { warn("netConnect() failed"); goto cleanup2; } if (proxyUrl) { char *logProxy = getenv("log_proxy"); if (sameOk(logProxy,"on")) verbose(1, "CONNECT %s:%d HTTP/1.0 via %s:%d\n", hostName, port, connectHost,connectPort); struct dyString *dy = newDyString(512); dyStringPrintf(dy, "CONNECT %s:%d HTTP/1.0\r\n", hostName, port); setAuthorization(pxy, "Proxy-Authorization", dy); dyStringAppend(dy, "\r\n"); mustWriteFd(fd, dy->string, dy->stringSize); dyStringFree(&dy); // verify response char *newUrl = NULL; boolean success = netSkipHttpHeaderLinesWithRedirect(fd, proxyUrl, &newUrl); if (!success) { warn("proxy server response failed"); goto cleanup2; } if (newUrl) /* no redirects */ { warn("proxy server response should not be a redirect"); goto cleanup2; } } fbio=BIO_new_socket(fd,BIO_NOCLOSE); // BIO_NOCLOSE because we handle closing fd ourselves. if (fbio == NULL) { warn("BIO_new_socket() failed"); goto cleanup2; } sbio = BIO_new_ssl(ctx, 1); if (sbio == NULL) { warn("BIO_new_ssl() failed"); goto cleanup2; } sbio = BIO_push(sbio, fbio); BIO_get_ssl(sbio, &ssl); if(!ssl) { warn("Can't locate SSL pointer"); goto cleanup2; } /* Server Name Indication (SNI) Required to complete tls ssl negotiation for systems which house multiple domains. (SNI) This is common when serving HTTPS requests with a wildcard certificate (*.domain.tld). This line will allow the ssl connection to send the hostname at tls negotiation time. It tells the remote server which hostname the client is connecting to. The hostname must not be an IP address. */ if (!isIpv4Address(hostName) && !isIpv6Address(hostName)) SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(ssl,hostName); BIO_set_nbio(sbio, 1); /* non-blocking mode */ while (1) { if (BIO_do_handshake(sbio) == 1) { break; /* Connected */ } if (! BIO_should_retry(sbio)) { //BIO_do_handshake() failed warn("SSL error: %s", ERR_reason_error_string(ERR_get_error())); goto cleanup2; } fd = BIO_get_fd(sbio, NULL); if (fd == -1) { warn("unable to get BIO descriptor"); goto cleanup2; } FD_ZERO(&readfds); FD_ZERO(&writefds); if (BIO_should_read(sbio)) { FD_SET(fd, &readfds); } else if (BIO_should_write(sbio)) { FD_SET(fd, &writefds); } else { /* BIO_should_io_special() */ FD_SET(fd, &readfds); FD_SET(fd, &writefds); } tv.tv_sec = (long) (DEFAULTCONNECTTIMEOUTMSEC/1000); // timeout default 10 seconds tv.tv_usec = (long) (((DEFAULTCONNECTTIMEOUTMSEC/1000)-tv.tv_sec)*1000000); err = select(fd + 1, &readfds, &writefds, NULL, &tv); if (err < 0) { warn("select() error"); goto cleanup2; } if (err == 0) { warn("connection timeout to %s", hostName); goto cleanup2; } } struct netConnectHttpsParams *params; AllocVar(params); params->sbio = sbio; socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, params->sv); // netBlockBrokenPipes(); works, but is heavy handed // and ignores SIGPIPE on all connections for all threads in the entire application. // We are trying something more subtle and library and thread-friendly instead. int rc; rc = pthread_create(¶ms->thread, NULL, netConnectHttpsThread, (void *)params); if (rc) { errAbort("Unexpected error %d from pthread_create(): %s",rc,strerror(rc)); } return params->sv[0]; /* parent */ cleanup2: if (sbio) BIO_free_all(sbio); // will free entire chain of bios if (fd != -1) close(fd); // Needed because we use BIO_NOCLOSE above. Someday might want to re-use a connection. return -1; }